Position paper based on Keynote: Illiberal Loyalists: Viktor Orbán’s Regional Clientelistic Networks in the Western Balkans By Prof. Christina Eva Griessler
- ISSH Skopje
- Jun 5
- 2 min read
Group 2 (afternoon workshop 27th of May 2026)
The paper then introduces the concepts of clientelism, corruption, and state capture, which form the analytical basis for understanding Hungary’s engagement in the region. Clientelism is defined as a system of asymmetrical, reciprocal relationships in which political patrons distribute material benefits in exchange for political loyalty. This dynamic undermines transparency, fairness, and institutional effectiveness. State capture refers to the collusion of political and economic elites who use state institutions for private gain. The paper argues that Hungary under Orbán exhibited features of both clientelism and state capture, and that these practices were exported—intentionally or through political affinity—to parts of the Western Balkans.
The Western Balkan region already contained entrenched clientelistic structures, making it receptive to Orbán’s model. Leaders such as Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia, Nikola Gruevski in North Macedonia (during his tenure), Edi Rama in Albania, and Milorad Dodik in Republika Srpska operated within systems characterized by patronage, politicized public administration, and weak rule‑of‑law institutions. Orbán’s engagement reinforced these tendencies by providing political support, financial resources, and symbolic legitimacy. The paper highlights that in Serbia, Hungarian influence was particularly strong, facilitated by the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ), which acted as a conduit for Hungarian political and media influence, including through Pannon RTV.
Orbán’s foreign policy approach is interpreted through role theory, which distinguishes between a state’s self‑perception (ego‑part) and the expectations of others (alter‑part). Orbán defined Hungary’s identity in terms of conservative values, illiberal democracy, national sovereignty, and Christian Europe. This identity shaped Hungary’s foreign policy and justified its engagement with like‑minded leaders in the Western Balkans. At the same time, Western Balkan leaders—often labelled “stabiliocrats”—welcomed Orbán’s support because it strengthened their domestic positions and provided an alternative to EU pressure.
In spite of the clientelistic networks, and propagating ideological alignment, Orban retained a geopolitical pragmatic stance on the enlargement as both principled and strategic. It is linked with the illiberal value system – Hungary helping Europe to preserve its predominantly Christian civilization – but it is also geopolitically pragmatic too. In other words, we do not expect this to change much with the new prime minister of Hungary (Mr. Magyar)
The paper concludes that Orbán partially succeeded in establishing a leadership role in the Western Balkans, but this role was heavily dependent on personal networks, informal arrangements, and the political needs of local elites. His influence did not translate into stable regional leadership but rather into a patchwork of loyalist ties shaped by clientelism and mutual political benefit.
Based on prof. Griessler’s overall analysis we expect this geopolitical pragmatism to prevail in Magyar’s government too, but perhaps with new political allies.
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