Position paper based on Keynote: Illiberal Loyalists: Viktor Orbán’s Regional Clientelistic Networks in the Western Balkans By Prof. Christina Eva Griessler
- ISSH Skopje
- Jun 5
- 2 min read
Group 1 (afternoon workshop 27th of May 2026)

The paper examines Viktor Orbán’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans from 2010 to 2026, focusing on how Hungary under his leadership sought to build influence through political loyalism, clientelistic networks, and selective financial engagement. Although Hungary officially supported EU enlargement, Orbán simultaneously promoted anti‑EU narratives and used bilateral relations to strengthen his personal and political profile in the region. The central research question is whether Orbán succeeded in establishing a leadership role in the Western Balkans supported by a regional clientelistic network.
The paper begins by situating Hungary’s foreign policy priorities: Euro‑Atlantic integration, good neighbourly relations, and support for Hungarian minorities abroad. After joining NATO (1999) and the EU (2004), Hungary initially acted as a constructive supporter of Western Balkan enlargement. However, disillusionment with the EU’s internal dynamics, combined with the 2015 migration crisis, shifted Orbán’s rhetoric toward a critique of “Brussels,” liberal values, and perceived Western dominance. Orbán increasingly positioned himself as a defender of Central European interests and a spokesperson for countries that felt misunderstood by older EU member states.
This shift coincided with growing frustration in the Western Balkans over the slow, unpredictable EU accession process. The paper notes that despite rhetorical commitments, EU member states repeatedly blocked enlargement steps, leaving candidate countries in a political limbo. Orbán used this opening to present Hungary as a more reliable and understanding partner, emphasizing shared historical experiences of foreign domination and post‑socialist transition. Hungary’s support for enlargement remained consistent, but Orbán advocated for a more political, less conditional approach, challenging the EU’s merit‑based framework. The appointment of Olivér Várhelyi as EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement further amplified Hungary’s influence, though it also raised concerns about undermining rule‑of‑law conditionality.
We would argue this shift is best explained by Ivan Krastvev’s and Stephen Holmes’ book he Light That Failed: Why the West Is Losing the Fight for Democracy, the return to illiberalism is seen as emanating from the complex of constantly trying and failing to be a proper European esp. in the aspects of “rule of law,” therefore invoking once old (illiberal) tradition of rule of law (of the authoritarian kind) while retaining the core structural components of a parliamentary democracy. This may explain the ideological alignment while advocating for EU enlargement. In other words, Orban’s and Hungary’s (now led by Peter Magyar) advocacy is geopolitical: strong Europe, and just as Hungary was the gatekeeper of Europe during the migrant crisis, now appears as a fortifier of the continent as European and Christian (in spite of the minor percentages of Muslim minorities, this territory is prevalently Christian and extends and deepens the wall of “European fortification”). We would say that such views do not need to be ideological, as Emanuel Macron’s presidency with the Union, when North Macedonia’s Negotiating Framework was adopted by the Consillium or the EU, was prefaced with the following slogan: “For a Geopolitical Europe!”



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